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Abstract
Regulatory convergence — within the E.U., across the Atlantic and internationally — is 
conventionally represented as not only benign but also as essential in crisis prevention. 
This paper articulates a different frame of reference: one in which regulators “crowd,” 
“herd” and sometimes merge, so mimicking and exacerbating financial market 
tendencies toward similarity and contagion, and drawing regulators and markets into the 
same vortex. The paper looks at some of the historical and contemporary circumstances 
in the U.K., wider E.U. and the U.S. that have given reign to these tendencies and also at 
some aspects of regulatory architecture and governance that reduce such tendencies. 
It mentions pre-crisis tendencies to regulatory subservience to financial markets, with 
such subservience having a deep history in the U.K. and a shorter one in the U.S.; so-
called command regulation, which has the potential to either deepen subservience or 
transcend it; and the institutional preconditions for permanent regulatory vigilance, such 
as democratic appointment of heads of agencies. The paper concludes by pondering 
the prospects for the democratic direction of financial market regulation, in terms of its 
distributional logics and extraterritoriality. 
162 The Journal of Financial Perspectives 
Regulatory herding versus democratic diversity: history and prospects
1. Introduction
A financial trade is said to be crowded when many market 
participants are trying to transact similarly — for example, to get 
into the euro, out of bank equity or into bonds. Traders may, in 
principle, hold to a variety of trading purposes, strategies and 
intentions; however, if they have come to rely upon the same, 
linked or similar information sources, analytical approaches, 
calculative tools and data pools, then they start to make similar 
decisions (in parallel rather than in consort). Crowding is 
widely considered to cause difficulties, since not everyone can 
move in the same direction without causing what eventually 
becomes recognized as bubbly and sometimes chaotic turning 
points. Economists, sociologists and ethnographers have 
various explanations for market crowding — such as information 
spillovers [Acharya and Yorulmazer (2006)], the performativity 
of calculative tools [MacKenzie (2003)] and common constraints 
on investment strategies [Pitluck (2014)]. Most commentators 
agree that crowding is not essentially a willful copying of others 
(that is herding, to be discussed below). Indeed, some crowders 
may hate that they feel obliged to do so, following common 
information sources and/or logics that seem to restrict their 
options. 
In herding, by contrast, market participants consciously, willingly 
and strategically emulate the broad trading patterns of those 
around them. Needless to say that despite the fact that they try 
to differentiate and spice up their market offerings — through 
corporate and product branding, complexification of derivatives, 
combinations of strategies and routing through multiple 
venues — the underlying aims and tactics remain similar. This 
deliberate and “sophisticated” herding goes beyond reliance on 
the information environment; it results from the explicit “me too 
[but better]” management claims, occupational cultures, product 
development and sales pitches. 
Do crowding and herding also occur in financial market 
regulation? Yes, they do. Crowding comes to the fore when 
regulators become reliant on similar mindsets, information 
sources and regulator rationales and objectives. Such was the 
case in the long period of complacency prior to the crises of 
2007 and onward [Engelen et al. (2011)]. It was not just that 
the regulatory mind-set models were wrong but rather that they 
were so similar; hence, allowing the same basic business model to 
proliferate so widely. More diversity would have been safer. There 
was a temporary disruption in the convergence in regulatory 
thinking, as the response to crisis precipitated some radical 
rethinking. “Post crisis” rethinking then quite rapidly recoalesced 
around the new notion of macroprudential regulation, which 
recognizes that problems arise not only with specific firms and 
trades but also systemically, in the interstices, connections 
and similarities. A similar recognition is needed in relation to 
regulation itself, this paper argues.
How solidified and homogeneous will macroprudential thinking 
turn out to be internationally? Empirically, the answer to that 
question is not clear. A range of answers might be suggested, 
depending on the perspective taken. Some commentators, 
taking a wide-ranging global perspective, suggest that crises 
have introduced greater heterogeneity into financial markets 
regulation, as many rising powers, such as the BRICS, deepen 
their critique of the failure of western, neoliberal, hitherto 
dominant approaches [Helleiner and Pagliari (2011)] and 
encourage construction of pivots for regulatory and interregional 
regulation [Leahy and Harding (2014)]. 
Other commentators, more focused on the U.S. and/or the E.U., 
have noted the rapidity with which regulators picked themselves 
up from the epistemic floor and have rebuilt and extended their 
organizations, networking and influence [Blyth (2013)]. Even 
so, European regulators in particular seem now to be in a more 
explicitly close relationship with ministers and heads of state 
than hitherto. That may sometimes push regulators in the same 
direction (for example, when heads of states are in accord), while 
at other times allowing for some national regulatory leeway [for 
example, when countries’ national elites seek to retain influence 
over regulation of “their” banks, see Spendzharova (2014)]. 
Jurisdictionally specific work, to be deployed here, suggests a 
long-term historical continuity: separation of financial market 
regulation from democratic politics. This separation leaves 
regulators with each other as their primary reference points, 
with herding as one consequence. Of course, the market retains 
some of its influence, even after the continuing scandals over 
fraud, conflict of interest, benchmark manipulation and trading 
venues’ favoritism of some market participants over others. Such 
conduction seems to have been very widespread, possibly more 
the norm than the exception. 
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Given recent developments, we seem to be in a historical period 
in which the international (Western led) regulatory-market 
nexus is under more pressure than was the case before the 
events of 2007 onward, opening up some possibilities for non-
trivial changes in governance of financial markets. Whether 
such opportunities can be grasped must depend, in part, on 
understanding the conditions that encourage regulatory crowding 
and herding.
2. Private regulation: aristocratic beginnings
In other policy areas, political parties choreograph and sometimes 
polarize questions of broad strategy, which, in relation to financial 
market policy, would involve asking questions like: what sort of 
banking do we want in coming decades in our country or region? 
Not so in relation to financial market regulation, and for good 
historical reasons. In exploring the historical issues, our principal 
scholarly debt must be to economic historians Cain and Hopkins 
for their account of the development of the City in relation to 
world trade and politics. Whilst the City’s side-stepping of the 
expanding sphere of democratic politics is not the main focus of 
Cain and Hopkins’ work, the latter helps us to contextualize (what 
became known as) financial market self-regulation. 
With reference to the period from the mid-nineteenth century up 
until the end of the Second World War, Cain and Hopkins (1987) 
refer to an “aristo-financial elite” of “gentlemanly capitalists,” 
which preferred to invest internationally rather than to support 
domestic industry. The success of this footloose strategy made 
the City more dynamic than international rivals and more 
politically important domestically than industrial capital. 
“The City’s overt political influence remained limited. But since 
City, government, and administration were so closely entwined, 
it is not surprising that many policy questions were regarded 
as being beyond the realm of party politics. It was assumed 
that matters of high finance could safely be left to the small 
circle of institutions which were thought to have an intuitive 
understanding of the ‘national interest.’ There is, of course, no 
denying that as landed wealth declined in importance, industrial 
as well as financial and commercial wealth grew rapidly. 
Nonetheless, the influence of industry on central government 
and on economic policy continued to be limited by its relative 
lack of access to the major sources of power and influence. 
Manufacturers were still largely outside the circle of gentlemanly 
culture and did not ‘speak the same language’ as the aristo-
financial elite. And, insofar as they did gain political influence, any 
residual Cobdenite radicalism was likely to be muted by the need 
to join gentlemanly interests in defending property against the 
threats posed by trades unions and the spread of democracy.” 
[Cain and Hopkins (1987, 6)]
Thus, potential opposition to the aristo-financial elite was 
fragmented. “Militant manufacturers” — as Cain and Hopkins at 
one point describe British industrialists, who sometimes found 
themselves disadvantaged by the City’s investments in foreign 
industry — tried to push back politically; however, they were 
inhibited from taking an overtly oppositional position, because 
of their concerns over working class pressures, against which 
manufacturers made common cause with London and the shires. 
Meanwhile, working class political claims were also somewhat 
circumscribed by pride over Great Britain’s standing in the world 
and by political identification with the industrial, financial and 
political arrangements that underpinned this (international 
trade, sterling, Britain’s standing in the world, empire, etc.). An 
important consequence was that issues concerning the City and 
its governance were conceptualized as being “above politics” 
[Cain and Hopkins (2013, 340)] or, as one could also say, beyond 
politics. The City did not need to influence government, because 
financiers and political elites were interwoven. 
The adoption of Cain and Hopkins’ work as a broad framework 
for understanding the history of financial market regulation 
might be thought too risky because, although their work has 
attracted praise for its scope, depth and originality, it also 
has been criticized. The grounds of criticism include that it is 
allegedly “excessively monocausal;” finance-centric (paying 
insufficient attention to other sectors and their strategies); 
Eurocentric (paying insufficient attention to “autonomous 
impulses emanating from the periphery”); neglectful of cultural 
and religious aspects; and in some constructivist critiques, 
fails to recognize that “the Empire was always an imaginative 
construct” [see Cannadine (1995, 194)]. It seems to the present 
writer, however, that a “gentlemanly capitalist” framing of finance 
usefully captures cultural as well as economic aspects of class 
alliances and antagonisms — both internationally and within 
Britain. The international aspects are by no means restricted to 
the Empire, since much of the City’s investment historically went 
much wider. These authors’ placing of the City in terms both of 
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foreign policy and domestic policy is valuable and some of the 
potential implications for us today will be taken up later. 
In short, Cain and Hopkins’ work, alongside that of other 
economic historians, such as Daunton (1989), and political 
scholars such as Michael Moran (1988), usefully illuminates 
the historical, institutional and cultural setting within which 
financial market regulation arose in club/private form, outside 
the party political sphere. Indeed it has become common ground 
amongst social, economic and political historians of the City 
that, despite the advent of the general franchise in 1918, such 
private regulation in the City was hardly touched by democracy. 
As Johal et al. (2012) put it: “The Bank of England, which had 
hitherto been fairly marginal in the regulation of the City, now 
emerged as a critical institution. It used its authority to reshape 
the government of markets. The war had destroyed the kind 
of open international economy of which the City had been a 
centrepiece. After 1918 City markets were organised into a series 
of cartels policed by trade associations. The cartelisation of the 
markets, coupled with the authority of the Bank of England, was 
sufficient to sustain what the City called self regulation: accepting 
the disciplines of self regulation was the price firms paid for 
being allowed into the privileged cartels. The stability of the self 
regulatory system in the decades after 1918 allowed the City 
further to elaborate its regulatory ideology. This pictured the City 
as a special part of the economy, claiming exemption from one 
of the main features of 20th century economic government in 
Britain — the apparently inexorable rise of the state as a regulator 
of economic life” (ibid., 69).
Turning now to the period from the end of the Second World 
War up until the 1980s — a period in which Britain struggled 
in the face of recession, war and competition from the U.S. — 
Cain and Hopkins point to a development that is in no way 
prefigured by their analysis of earlier centuries. British finance 
found itself rehabilitated by the geopolitical response of the 
U.S. to communism. “In the Great War, Britain had needed 
American capital to secure victory: after 1939 her very survival 
depended on American aid. […] The initial quid pro quo sought 
by the United States for her extensive aid was the abolition of 
imperial preference, the destruction of the sterling system, and 
— ultimately — decolonization. However, with the emergence of 
Russo-American antagonism after the [Second World] War, all 
these elements of Britain’s world power survived as valued assets 
in the Cold War, so much so that sterling was launched on a new 
international career in the 1950s as a junior partner of the dollar. 
Gentlemanly capitalists who had once provided the framework for 
the Pax Britannica now survived to fight another day under the 
protection of the Pax Americana.” [Cain and Hopkins (1987, 17)]
In these circumstances, fortunate for the U.K. and especially for 
the City, the latter not only survived but thrived, and its economic 
expansion helped to underpin its political autonomy, at least up 
until the 1980s. What remains somewhat controversial is to what 
extent that situation changed as a result of neoliberal reforms in 
the 1980s. 
2. Mother of regulators: history of pseudo-public regulation in 
the U.K. 
An important question is whether the U.K. policy reforms of the 
1980s can be understood in terms of political disruption of the 
preceding historical arrangements of private or club regulation. 
The orthodox position — which dominated the academic literature 
as well as policy thinking before the financial crisis — concedes 
the history of club regulation, whilst claiming that modernizing 
reforms under both Conservative and Labour administrations 
displaced historical arrangements. According to the orthodox 
narrative, the opening up of the City by “Big Bang,” the creation 
first of a Securities Investment Board (SIB) and then of an 
“independent” regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
swept away the old order. So says the conventional history; but on 
what grounds?
This question can be taken in stages, starting with the SIB, the 
forerunner to the FSA.
Writing in the 1980s about the SIB, Moran refers to the City 
having “lost the battle to keep the politicians and the civil 
servants at bay.” On the other hand, the SIB “is conventionally 
described as self regulation within a statutory framework” 
[Moran (1988, 22)]. And: “It [the SIB] is, in essence, a franchising 
operation: semi-private and private bodies (the SIB and the 
various self-regulatory organizations) will be awarded a franchise 
to exercise legally backed powers of regulation” (ibid., 24). 
If the transition arrangements represented by the SIB did not 
really signal a decisive break with club/private regulation — but 
rather institutionalized those arrangements within public policy— 
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then the next question is, to what extent did the advent of the 
FSA as such change things? Or, to put the question slightly 
differently, did the FSA outgrow and overcome the historical, 
club/private regulation heritage? 
With benefit of hindsight — in the circumstances observable from 
2007 onward — revisionist work (including my own) suggests 
that the FSA represented continuation of private/club regulation 
within a façade of public regulation [Dorn (2014)]. In a focused 
study of the FSA, McPhilemy (2013) suggests that the FSA 
deployed a massively technical rulebook alongside continuation 
of cosy “club” regulation. The older tradition was hidden within 
the newer one: so says the revisionist story. Gilligan’s (1997) 
deployment of the notion of the “relative autonomy” of financial 
market regulation drives in a broadly similar direction. 
In the angry atmosphere following political recognition of the 
risks taken by the financial markets, the U.K. Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards castigated senior 
management within banks for evading and gaming regulation 
by thus setting up compliance regimes as “Potemkin villages to 
give the appearance of effective control and oversight, without 
the reality” [Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
(2013a, 43)]. However, the parliamentarians stopped short 
of applying such language to regulation itself. That distinction 
may be merited on empirical ground (and not simply as a matter 
of politesse). Potemkin villages are deliberately constructed 
from the start in order to mislead, a process that may be 
fairly discerned in financial market participants’ overt and 
frank gaming of regulation. Can we really say the same of the 
historical evolution of regulation? Until we find clear evidence of 
conspiracy, it might be safer to think of regulation in terms of a 
series of sins of omission. 
Bellringer and Michie (2014) have put forward the view that the 
opening up of the City was “an accident,” in the sense that it 
occurred in response to a contingent series of events. Bellringer 
and Michie’s work focuses on the liberalization of the London 
Stock Exchange, although they extend their conclusions to 
banking. There is, they say: “[A]n absence of evidence to connect 
the sequence of events that led to Big Bang, and even less to its 
consequences, with any conscious decision by the Conservative 
government whether through the actions of its politicians 
or officials. Nor was Big Bang the product of City influence 
with the deliberate intention of making London into a global 
financial centre. […] There is no evidence that the Conservative 
government under Mrs Thatcher intended to transform British 
banks into the dynamic sector of the British economy they had 
become prior to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/6. Neither 
the Conservative government that won the election of 1979 nor, 
in all probability, the Labour government that emerged from the 
landslide victory in 1997 had a detailed plan of how to transform 
the UK financial system into a globally competitive sector 
that would replace manufacturing as the engine of the British 
economy.” [Bellringer and Michie (2014, 22)]
Some refinement of that account is in order. No doubt it is true 
that neither Labour, in creating the SIB, nor Conservatives, in 
replacing the SIB with the FSA, had “a detailed plan of how to 
transform the U.K. financial system.” Incoming governments 
quite often lack detailed plans. However, both governments 
held a broadly “modernizing” agenda, rather putting into doubt 
Bellringer and Michie’s description of the reforms as accidental. 
Rather, the broad direction of change was foreseen, within which 
negotiations and step-by-step decision making filled in the detail. 
As the authors observe, the Conservatives came into office 
in 1979 on the basis of a radical commitment to competition 
and the break-up of all forms of cartels. It would have been 
politically difficult to retreat from that position, especially since a 
Restrictive Trading Practices Act (RTPA) had been enacted under 
the receding Labour government, after which the Office for Fair 
Trading had referred the rule-book of the Stock Exchange to the 
Court of the RTPA (ibid., 12). As for market context, Bellringer 
and Michie astutely observe that interests in the financial markets 
were diverse and shifting, there being both support for the old 
City ways and for innovation — as represented by upstart and 
unclubable banks, notably S.G. Warburg, which had introduced 
the Eurobond market and championed hostile takeovers in the 
industry. 
On the evidence presented by Bellringer and Michie and by 
many other commentators — and unsurprisingly — there were 
schisms that ran across politics and the markets, rather than any 
hegemonic bloc. For example, these authors refer to widespread 
City hostility to a new and upstart bank, SG Warburg. On the 
basis of having worked at SG Warburg, the then Secretary of 
State for Trade, John Nott, denounced its culture as “vigorous, 
unsentimental [and] meritocratic” [Nott (2002)] — a description 
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that would have been found apt by many at the time, be they 
detractors or supporters of such a manner of doing business. 
Given the mingling of and antagonisms between old, clubby, aristo-
financial networks and newer, “unsentimental” meritocrats, it is 
unsurprising that the outcomes, in terms of regulation, were not 
unitary. Taking the SIB and the FSA in turn and applying to them 
the historical analysis mentioned above, we might characterize the 
SIB in terms of a technocratic but somewhat flimsy superstructure 
(the board itself) erected over — almost floating over — the 
foundations of club regulation (diverse self-regulatory bodies). 
As Moran (1988, 27) has it, with the establishment of the SIB 
and its self-regulatory bodies, “semi-private and private bodies 
[were] awarded a franchise to exercise legally backed powers 
of regulation.” Of course, each self-regulatory body more or 
less corresponded to an existing pocket of private regulation, 
already holding a franchise, so perhaps it was rather more a 
case of the SIB acknowledging than awarding franchises. At that 
stage of regulatory reform, the private nature of regulation was 
retained, being overtly acknowledged, although being somewhat 
bureaucratized: the proliferation of rulebooks began. 
The FSA presented a further development of these private-
public arrangements, installing club regulation within a unitary 
public institution. The FSA was a victory for modernity in terms 
of its appearance — diverse bodies were replaced by one — and 
in terms of its formal routines at the operational level. However, 
it retained clubby relations and functioning at management 
and policy levels (as McPhilemy and other revisionist authors 
cited above suggest). The FSA was not a Potemkin village — the 
construction of such a conspiracy would have required a level of 
unity and organization that was beyond the capacities available 
at the time — but neither was it an accident. It was more of a 
regroupment of historical forces, re-settling private mentality 
within a public façade. 
3. Global subservience, national command, local activism: 
three regulatory playbooks
Widening our focus to Europe and the U.S., we find three 
regulatory playbooks: (i) regulators’ subservience to markets, 
which in the pre-crisis period had to some extent spilled over 
from the U.K. to other jurisdictions; (ii) so-called “command 
regulation,” in which regulators are strongly supported by or 
directed by federal politicians, meaning that they may be directed 
to apply either a heavy hand or a lighter and “recalibrating” one, 
depending on the political mood (a heavier hand emerging with 
recognition of the seriousness of the crisis, then receding); and 
(iii) regulators and prosecutors (acting as conduct supervisors) 
are sometimes locally appointed or elected, making them 
structurally independent of federal governments and also of 
regulates (and a thorn in the side for both). Here we briefly 
discuss these three, before going on to assess future prospects 
within the contemporary European scene.
3.1 Pre-crisis regulatory subservience, as revealed by  
the crisis
Once the depth of the crisis had been recognized, public 
regulation of financial markets became seen as something of 
an imposter. In the U.S., federal agencies became seen as being 
rather too close to the industry [Miller and Dinan (2009) and, 
for a pre-crisis review of evidence, see Bó (2006)]. Keynesian 
economist James Crotty put things as follows: “The design and 
implementation of the changes needed in financial markets is a 
political as much as an economic challenge. Unfortunately, most 
elected officials responsible for overseeing US financial markets 
have been strongly influenced by efficient market ideology and 
corrupted by campaign contributions and other emoluments 
lavished on them by financial corporations. […] Moreover, 
powerful appointed officials in the Treasury Department, the SEC, 
the Federal Reserve System and other agencies responsible for 
financial market oversight are often former employees of large 
financial institutions who return to their firms or lobby for them 
after their time in office ends. Their material interests are best 
served by letting financial corporations do as they please in a 
lightly regulated environment. We have, in the main, appointed 
foxes to guard our financial chickens” [Crotty (2009, 577)].
On reflection, perhaps that last line should have been written as 
appointing “fox cubs to guard foxes?” Leaving that aside, acerbic 
commentary — which would have been dismissed as oddball or (in 
the U.S. context) un-American before the emergence of financial 
market crisis — became mainstream in the years following 
2008 [see for example Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards (2013a)]. 
It is however fair to mention that the above judgment about 
ideology, emoluments, revolving doors and institutional 
corruption in regulatory agencies may be rather too sweeping. 
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Not all those who cross over from markets to regulatory agencies, 
or vice versa, take all of their intellectual baggage, buddy 
obligations or emotional attachments with them. 
Indeed, some research suggests that the workings of regulatory 
agencies at national and at international levels are more nuanced 
than that. Looking at some case studies involving the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Tai and Carpenter (2014) 
summarize that “the evidence for capture is variable [and] the 
precise role of the revolving door is not yet clear. These authors 
suggest that, rather than motivating regulators to act favorably 
toward industry or causing them to adopt industry arguments 
uncritically, the revolving door seems to act as one type of 
a general influence that past experience has on regulators’ 
perspectives” [Tai and Carpenter (2014, 227)] [regarding 
international regulatory committees, see Young (2012)]. In 
one sense, a person who goes through a revolving door may be 
better placed (and sometimes may even be motivated) to take 
action: whether they do so or not depends on circumstances 
(see following paragraphs). On the other hand, a person who has 
never worked in the industry, and who comes with a different 
occupational history, may struggle to make sense of aspects 
of the industry [especially since some of its famous complexity 
has been designed to “game” regulation, see McBarnet (2010) 
and Gerding (2013)]. So, it is not so easy to say that separating 
regulatory careers from industry careers would automatically 
improve the quality of regulation. We have to say: it would 
depend.
3.2 Command regulation: not necessarily restrictive
Political leadership matters: it can exacerbate collusionary 
dynamics within the regulator-industry nexus — as U.K. regulator 
Lord Turner plausibly alleged in relation to U.K. Chancellor of 
the Exchequer Gordon Brown in the run-up to the crisis [Waugh 
(2009)] — or it can work against the grain of regulator cooption. 
In this paper, we refer to both these possibilities as command 
regulation, although the second sense is the more familiar use 
of the term. Indeed history offers us examples of regulators who 
gain the support of political leaders to carry through sustained 
regulatory reform — such as James Landis, who gained the 
support of several U.S. Presidents for firm regulation from the 
1930s onward [O’Brien (2014), Scott/National Public Radio 
(2004)].
Something similar happened (albeit briefly) in the U.S. from 
2008 onward, with a return to forms of command regulation 
that had not been seen since the New Deal. And of course 
the U.K. — long considered within Europe to be a bastion of 
neoliberalism — became equally, if not more, interventionist, with 
parliamentarians feeling badly let down by financial market elites, 
particularly banking elites [Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards (2013b), Kerr and Robinson (2011)]. For some years, 
the U.K. found itself broadly in accord with other European 
Union member states on the need for action across the board 
in the years immediately following 2008, resulting in a massive 
re-regulatory effort, causing dizziness for regulators [Tsingou 
(2010)] as well as for market participants and their compliance 
departments. 
Nevertheless, there are already reminders that command 
regulation is the historical exception to the rule, both in the 
U.S. and in Europe. In the U.S., the foxes are returning [Gandel 
(2015)] and there has been a sustained push back against the 
Dodd-Frank Act [United States (2010)], with sections of the 
industry putting sand in the wheels of the laborious process 
of moving from primary legislation to the regulatory rulebook 
[Coffee (2011)]. Moreover, at the end of 2014, Congress cut back 
aspects of the legislation [Przybyla and Wasson (2014), Johnson 
(2015)]. And in Europe, the longer drawn-out and deeper crisis 
and depression is currently being interpreted in terms of a need 
to encourage capital markets in particular, through the creation 
of a Capital Markets Union (CMU): thus command regulation 
may turn out to be a quite brief historical moment, which is now 
moderating in favor of regulatory “recalibration” [Van Steenis 
(2014)]. CMU seeks to overcome “barriers to a well-functioning 
securitization markets in the E.U.” [Bank of England and 
European Central Bank (2014, 15–18)]. These barriers include 
“too big to fail” banks, aspects of Basel capital rules and rating 
agencies’ caution toward derivatives in the shadow of the crisis. 
Interestingly, CMU and the recalibration opportunity that it 
offers may be seen more as an opportunity than a threat within 
the banking sector, if recalibration involves some loosening 
of bank regulation [Milne (2014, 16). European Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker’s 2014 appointment letter 
to Lord Hill, the then Commissioner-designate for Financial 
Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, tasked 
him with finding “appropriate ways to revive sustainable and 
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high quality securitization markets, to reduce the cost of raising 
capital in the Union and to develop alternatives to our companies’ 
dependence on bank funding” [Juncker (2014, 4)]. Considering 
what this might mean in terms of regulation, Hill’s statement 
to the European Parliament included the following: “Now [after 
the banking crisis] we are entering a new phase. Although we 
must continue to be alert to the emergence of new risks in 
our system and stand ready to take appropriate action, we are 
unlikely, over the next 5 years, to need to pass the same amount 
of new legislation again. The work done by the last Commission 
therefore provides a clear framework for the next Commission: 
regulation needs to be stable as well as rigorous. The priority will 
thus be implementation, enforcement, and evaluation. If, during 
this process, evidence appears that we have not got it quite right, 
we should not be afraid to make quick and effective adjustments” 
[Hill (2014, 4)].
All of the above historical and contemporary points show that 
regulatory command over financial markets is possible when 
policy makers lend their support to it — the other side of that 
coin being that “policy fatigue” and/or a change in political 
atmosphere allows regulatory recalibration and roll-back.
3.3 Exceptionally: local and democratic mandates
Our third and last illustration of the contingent nature of the 
relation between markets and regulators concerns local pivots of 
power within federalized systems. Within the U.S., state Attorney 
Generals have long led the charge against market misconduct, 
and for good reason. In most U.S. states, Attorney Generals are 
elected and, as such, are subject to a governance structure and 
a set of motivations different from those of federal regulatory 
agencies. State Attorney Generals can be socially distant from 
federal ministries and closer to popular sentiment. Moreover, 
in the important case of New York, the Martin Act gives extra 
leverage to prosecutors [O’Brien (2005)]. 
The combination of these factors — electoral selection, specific 
powers and distance from ministerial restraint — gives market 
(mis)conduct regulation more “bite” in New York than elsewhere 
in the U.S., and also much more than in European countries. 
Before the emergence of the financial crisis, New York State 
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer castigated investment banks as 
being “at the vortex” of wrongdoing and he opined that “the 
solution is not more regulation but more innovative application 
of existing enforcement strategies” [Eliot Spitzer, New York 
Attorney General, speaking in 2004, cited in O’Brien (2005)]. 
Understandably, Mr Spitzer was unpopular in the industry — 
though not in his electorate — and in time the sort of investigative 
powers he had deployed against financial market misconduct in 
New York were turned against his person, personally disgracing 
him and causing his resignation [Gross (2010)]. Whether or not 
that was a honey-trap operation has never been ascertained. 
However, New York State Attorneys — and the New York 
Department of Financial Services (DFS) – continue to weigh 
in, frequently embarrassing federal agencies [Schneiderman 
(2014), O’Brien (2004)]. All of this suggests that, even when 
federal agencies lack high political backing for robust action, local 
circumstances can provide a basis for it. 
We can now summarize the above three points about regulation 
and its varied capacities for capture and for activism. (i) An 
industry-regulation revolving door certainly exists but what 
goes through it may be a set of occupational experiences and 
mentalities, rather than sure-fire corruption. (ii) The revolving 
door can be locked shut by political power — for example, if one 
key senior policy maker gives his or her support to a regulator 
committed to command regulation; this tends to happen for 
a while after periods of crisis, during which time light touch 
regulation becomes less politically untenable than in boom times. 
(iii) Local circumstances, electoral politics and legal powers can 
make a difference, distancing agencies and individuals within 
them from federal government influences as well as from the 
industry. Which of these comes to the fore? We have to say, “it 
depends.” 
4. Europe and the single market: mixed prospects for 
politicization
Following the Second World War, the London approach to 
financial market regulation was projected upwards and 
outwards, to the European and also up to international levels. 
This was important for the development of the European 
Community (EC), its single market and the modes of governance 
thereof. Elsewhere I have summarized the forces at work in 
the following terms: “[The Bank of England] was strategically 
pro-EC, acting in accord with the City’s historical international 
orientation. For example, to the considerable annoyance of 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Governor of the Bank Leigh 
Pemberton later went so far as to sign the 1989 report of 
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Jacques Delors on monetary union […] Understanding and 
shaping the emerging EC agenda on financial service regulation 
facilitated the bank’s domestic agenda-shaping, underlining that 
Parliament was the agenda-taker” [Dorn (2014, 16)].
Why the Bank of England favored the development of the EC, 
Britain’s eventual entry into it, and the construction of the euro, is 
no mystery. The Community and its single market represented an 
opportunity for the City. Some commentators go further, seeing 
British entry into the EC as a part of the politics of opening up 
the British economy, including financial services, to the rigors 
of a global economy: “membership of the EC was trumpeted 
as a liberal measure opening up British markets to competitive 
pressures that would force [UK] business to rationalise” [Gifford 
(2007, 467–468)]. Some see British entry as transforming 
Europe: through entry, Britain became “a vehicle and protagonist 
for the globalisation of Europe” (ibid., 465). Indeed, that had 
been a fear of President De Gaulle, in opposing British entry. In 
the event, eventual entry in 1973 not only helped to open up the 
EC (as it then was) to international trade, it also provided a meta-
reform at home: financial market regulation, once tied into the 
single market process, was further distanced from the domestic 
political process. Since then, there has been much water under 
the bridge, with the creation of the multi-level Lamfalussy 
architecture [Posner (2010)], which was then replaced by three 
European Supervisory Authorities and, for the Eurozone, the 
European Central Bank — the influence of which has become 
much enhanced in the context of the Eurozone crisis [Moloney 
(2012)]. 
What has not changed is the extent to which parliaments at either 
the regional or national levels have struggled to exert influence. 
The European Parliament has been rather in the position of dotting 
the i’s and crossing the t’s of proposals brought forward by the 
European Commission: a task of considerable interest to regulatees 
— who lobby the Parliament passionately — but not clearly 
connected to debates between MEPs and their publics. National 
parliaments have rather acted more as semi-expert arenas for 
governments to test out and fine-tune proposals, and as arenas 
to let off political steam as displays of “banker bashing” indicate, 
rather than stirring strong inter-party debates amongst European 
citizens. These are honorable roles but they also represent 
the historically-bequeathed, rather restricted notion of what 
parliaments are for, when it comes to financial market regulation.
What then might be the prospects for a broader and more 
adversarial public politics of finance? According to political 
scientists Swen Hutter and Edgar Grande, politicization means 
issues becoming salient not just for elites, but also for wider 
sections of society and for political parties, who then take a 
variety of positions on those issues, amounting to polarization 
within the political arena [Hutter and Grande (2014)]. 
Polarization, expressed in the form of institutional conflict in 
open fora, is taken as evidence of politicization, with salience 
being the necessary precondition. Politicization may sometimes 
be triggered by so-called “fringe” parties (which were quite 
successful in European elections in 2014). Yet, it could also result 
from the mobilization of “mainstream” parties.
For present purposes, the question is to how much salience, 
mobilizing power and polarizing potential currently attach to 
issues around financial markets, politicizing their governance. 
Such politicization would demote econocrats down to the 
level of operationalization of policies, rather than formulation 
thereof. Empirically, the answer seems to be that politicization 
of such issues has not strongly occurred yet, in the sense that, 
whilst there has been much political pressure on regulators, 
this pressure has come more from elite political circles to “do 
something,” than from political parties’ mobilization of citizens. 
Admittedly, in the European elections in 2014, an anti-neoliberal 
party in Greece, Syriza (Coalition of the Radical Left) did very 
well against incumbent political parties — suggesting that under 
conditions, such as a combination of bank bailouts plus austerity 
under outside direction, domestic political opinion can become 
polarized. Yet, in other countries, such a Spain (admittedly not 
so badly hit as Greece), consensus politics has held up. Indeed, 
most mainstream political parties across the E.U. did not strongly 
articulate issues around financial markets per se — they focused 
more on the euro, postulating a need to save it. Nor was financial 
market reform a central rallying cry for the various Eurosceptic 
parties that have come to prominence in countries such as France 
and the U.K. (the latter’s UKIP is headed by an ex-commodity 
trader, who however talks about other issues). 
So, scanning and summarizing across the EU, it seems that while 
fiscal issues may have been contested in some member states, 
financial market issues have not been strongly politicized. Why 
so? The context is a series of interlinked crises around banks and 
bailouts, the euro and austerity measures. The “highly unequal 
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distributional effects” of all this cause a “dramatic decline of 
citizens” trust in the European polity in recent years [which] is 
a consequence of the higher political salience and lower factual 
plausibility of arguments adduced to legitimate the exercise 
of governing powers at the European level” [Scharpf (2014)]. 
However, the potential political mobilizing consequences have to 
some extent been contained by European elites’ top level power 
bargaining (more between themselves and with banking interests 
than with their citizens), and by heads of states’ common strategy 
of building new arrangements of economic governance on an 
intergovernmental basis, outside the E.U. and escaping many 
of its legal and political constraints [Schimmelfennig (2014)]. 
Associated with this, “mainstream” political parties have sought 
not to rock the political boat, so do not publicly contest with each 
other the fundamental questions about financial markets. Elite 
bargaining, at a distance from party politics, is one reason that 
such questions have not been more politicized. 
A second and rather ironic reason that financial markets have 
been spared politicization is the euro crisis. The euro and the 
various positions taken vis-à-vis it — save it, stay in it, make 
sacrifices for it, induce other people to make sacrifices for 
it, leave it, etc. — have definitely occupied much of the public 
debating space in the euro area since 2009. Lacking such a 
political preoccupation, banking per se might otherwise have 
become a bit more politicized in Europe. Such a “currency 
distraction” does not occur in the U.S., which does not suffer 
from structural conditions and contradictions that produced the 
euro crisis (currency union without political union). 
A third reason that public debate on financial markets and their 
governance has remained somewhat shallow, and not politicized 
in the sense under discussion here, is that the financial markets 
have become a focus for moral outrage, as elites, media and 
populations react to recurrent scandals [frauds, mis-selling, 
market manipulation of Libor and many other benchmarks, 
“front running” by high frequency traders in dark pools, etc. see 
Schneiderman (2014)]. Under differing political circumstances, 
moral/ethical considerations might have acted as a stimulus 
to the asking of fundamental questions about what financial 
markets are for, and to political parties’ contestations on such 
questions. In the event, however, given the “issue competition” 
provided by the euro crisis and austerity measures, and the 
reluctance of mainstream political parties in most E.U. member 
states to open up fundamental questions about financial markets, 
such questions have tended to decompose into debates about 
punishment of individuals and the reform of “banking culture.” 
In parliaments, the press and scholarly work, the latter issues 
still tend to be posed in terms of professional ethics rather than 
democratic direction [see, for example, Law and Financial Markets 
Review, 8(2), whole issue].
For all these reasons — mainstream political parties’ reluctance 
to engage with big issues around financial markets, issue 
competition from the euro crisis and the seduction of 
responding to financial market participants’ bad behavior — 
politicization of the governance of financial markets has 
been limited to date. The technocratic terms of debate 
seem as firmly seated as ever [Blyth (2013)]. Experts argue 
amongst themselves in a language that is as assertive as it is 
impenetrable to citizens. Outside the regulatory gates, there 
has been public anger, yet this has taken the forms of cynicism 
over elites, with some displacement of anger unto foreigners 
and marginal groups. Banking and other financial services 
have indeed moved into the center of political debate, yet the 
discourse still escapes party political polarization (with the 
exception of a minority of hard-hit Eurozone countries). This is 
both a normative problem and a functional one. 
5. Articulating public policy preferences
Normatively, it must be unacceptable that such a core aspect 
of governance should continue to be convened outside the 
arena of common politics. Tacitly, political parties have adopted 
emergency powers, crisis resolution mentality, giving carte 
blanche to leaders and technocrats. Thus, whilst financial 
market regulation was previously implicitly off the party political 
agenda, it is now explicitly off. Centrist political parties of both 
Left and Right hold much responsibility here, for their failure to 
take up fundamental questions about banking and other aspects 
of financial markets and to stimulate debate and deliberation. 
Shamefully, it has been left to so-called “fringe” parties to engage 
with these issues, starting from the political orientations of their 
constituencies, then from there articulating visions of the broad 
purposes that should be served by financial markets. 
What might such debates look like? We start with some functional 
questions, which on the face of things might appear to some 
citizens to be only lightly politicized, then move on to some 
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politically frank but functionally vague positions. Functionally, 
what kinds of financial markets citizens might want and for what 
purposes. For example, just personal banking or also some or all 
of the following. If “all,” then in what priority? Housing purchase 
(much more strongly emphasized in the UK than in some other 
countries); retirement savings (collective or individual?); domestic 
industrial investment (where the U.K. tradition has been to direct 
investment externally); and/or infrastructural development (by 
public or private actors?). 
Cutting across preferences regarding the end-purposes of 
financial markets are some geopolitical questions. Political parties 
might articulate value positions and preferences concerning the 
local, regional and international foci of financial markets and 
their relation to the real economy. Should financial markets be 
open to the international winds, in a universal model that allows 
any firm structure in any country and local context — this being 
more or less the current arrangement for the U.S. and the E.U. 
Alternatively, should particular types of financial markets be 
encouraged by particular countries, and other types by other 
countries, on the basis of complementarity with countries’ 
economic and social policies? Such differentiation is currently 
discernable on the wider global level — taking account of China, 
Russia and other countries [Tett and Farchy (2015)] — and is 
possibly being consolidated as the post-crisis norm [Helleiner and 
Pagliari (2011)]. And/or, should financial markets, or aspects of 
such markets, be subordinated to regional and local policies and 
economies, on the model of old-style local and regional banks 
[Knafo (2006, 183), and for prospective comments see Leaver 
and Williams (2014, 221)]? 
Also cutting across questions about the purposes of financial 
markets is the question of who pays for them when they blow 
up. Are citizens still prepared to bail out banks and other 
vehicles at national level? That is the model perfected in the 
U.S. [Dorn (2012)] but made notorious in Ireland and many 
other countries from 2008 onward. Do citizens — and the 
political parties that compete to gain their votes — prefer to 
mutualize such risks at regional level? That is not an approach 
that currently gains much support in the E.U., although some 
actions of the European Central Bank allegedly arrive at such 
a result [which may survive legal challenge, see Cruz Villalón 
(2015)]. If citizens and political parties do not advocate 
any public support, then they need other means through 
which difficulties could be dealt with. National and European 
legislation has put in place resolution policies, according to 
which public bailout of failing banks is only one option, and not 
the first one. However, the long timeframe envisaged for the 
building up of banks’ own resolution funds makes clear that, for 
the next decade at least and possibly for the foreseeable future, 
public funds remain vulnerable. These distributional questions 
are inherently political.
Let us briefly mention three broad political profiles. 
Unreconstructed free marketers, such as neoliberal Republicans 
and Tea Party people in the U.S., disfavor state “interference.” 
They favor leaving the industry — and its customers — to their own 
devices. That would mean allowing failing banks, for example, 
to do just that: to fail. That policy option has so far been held at 
arm’s length, due to concerns about possible knock-on effects, 
especially through bank bond-holdings. By contrast, and with 
relevance in some parts of Europe, some political constituencies 
articulate the issues in terms of economic justice, the direction 
of financial recourses to the real economy, and possibly 
public ownership of financial entities and infrastructures (on a 
continuing basis, not just as an emergency intervention). For 
green parties, the purposes of the financial industry, as with 
other industries, include transformations aiming to safeguard 
the planet and its ecosystems. That could mean special attention 
to modes of financing (and hence governance) of commodity 
producers and traders, and control of financial instruments 
referencing foodstuffs, for example. 
And so on, the general approach being to start not with bankers’ or 
regulators’ agendas, but rather with political parties’ convictions, 
seeking to shape finance accordingly: chacun à son gout. 
The principle may be extended from domestic to international 
policy preferences. Consider, for example, the dissatisfaction 
that arose in French political circles in 2014 over the large level 
of fines, business curtailments and reputational damage that 
BNP Paribas suffered at the hand of the U.S. authorities in 2014, 
arising from the bank’s sustained breaches of U.S. sanctions law 
in respect of Iran and Sudan [the latter’s President having been 
indicted by the International Criminal Court, see Protess and 
Silver-Greenberg (2014)]. As an article in the Economist noted: 
“The case has left people on both sides of the Atlantic unhappy. 
One reason is that the individuals responsible seem to be getting 
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off lightly. Some have been disciplined by BNP with demotions 
and cuts in pay, and some top brass are being pushed out the 
door, including Mr Chodron de Courcel. None, however, has 
faced even the mildest legal sanction so far; instead, the bank’s 
shareholders and customers look likely to bear the brunt of BNP’s 
misdeeds” [Economist (2014)]. As the same source went on to 
observer: “A second source of discontent — in Europe, at any rate 
— is that the case appears to be an example of America throwing 
its financial weight around, using the threat of withholding access 
to its market and currency to force compliance with its own 
priorities. The French central bank sent a clear message that, 
whatever the rights and wrongs of BNP’s behavior, crippling so 
large a European bank could harm the world’s financial system, 
as well as a region struggling for growth. BNP’s behavior in 
doing business with the likes of Sudan may have been morally 
reprehensible but it did not break European or French laws 
(though falsifying documents would be a crime anywhere). 
By eagerly exploiting their authority over dollar-denominated 
transactions, American regulators are increasing the incentives 
for international banks to set up a payments system based on 
another currency” [Economist (2014)].
In some regions and countries, national political elites’ historical 
concern over U.S. economic dominance coalesces with dislike 
of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. justice [Financial Times 
(2014)]. Such jurisdiction remains applicable as long as banks 
clear in dollars, which at some stage have to pass back to the 
U.S., triggering the latter’s jurisdictional claim. Could the euro or 
the yuan provide an alternative vehicle for clearing? Potentially, 
however for the present the dollar remains the principal currency 
of international trade and it would take some time and effort to 
put another currency into a comparable position. Maybe in time 
the BRICS will develop a new channel. If so, bank regulation might 
not only diverge from U.S. norms in respect of international 
sanctions, it might also diverge on a regulatory wider front. 
Summarizing, we can say that as for the future, there is potential 
for financial market regulation to be shaped — and differentiated — 
by the diverse foreign policies of countries and blocs, as well as by 
their domestic policy preferences. Against that, regulatory elites 
to some extent transcend domestic and regional differences, so 
reinforcing preferences within transglobal financial service firms 
for similarity in regulatory regimes. Reading this, most readers 
will know which side they are on.
6. Conclusion
Regulators crowd when they form a common culture, which, 
although it is partially detached from their diverse origins as 
individuals, does allow them to understand each other and 
to negotiate the meaning of events and what should be done 
about them. Going a step further, regulators herd when they 
intentionally and strategically set out, negotiate and agree global 
principles and rules (which nevertheless may be fine-tuned 
operationally and reputationally with an eye to jurisdictional 
competitiveness). Arguably, regulators were crowding before the 
crisis and, since then, have been engaged in various (sometimes 
fraught) arguments over the extent to which they should herd, 
at the European level and across the Atlantic [Akhtar and Jones 
(2013)]. 
Both crowding and herding are distinct from the final stage in 
convergence, which is merger. In the market, mergers occur 
through takeovers or through agreed mergers of equals, 
producing “financial institutions” that may then be regarded as 
too big to fail. Such was the situation that became recognized 
from 2008 onward, which is not solved today, as many regulators 
have pointed out [Haldane (2013)]. It is difficult and arguably 
impossible to discipline such entities. 
By analogy, what are we to think about global and regional 
regulators when they are in various stages of merger, such as 
in the E.U. (and particularly in the Eurozone)? Do they then 
become too big to fail, in the sense that they become politically 
untouchable? That question will come more into focus as 
European arrangements bed down: the Eurozone has a degree 
of centralized and technocratic rule that will be much studied 
and debated over the coming years. Whilst it is welcome that the 
European Parliament and national parliaments scrutinize financial 
market legislation proposals that have been proposed by other 
actors, such scrutiny remains agenda-taking. 
Meanwhile, the wider international regulatory networks, which 
before the crisis were dominated by U.S. and European ideas 
and personnel, have lost prestige and leadership capacity. As 
one transatlantic network has lamented: “the future of coherent 
global financial regulation is unclear […] the United States and 
European Union must act expeditiously and collaboratively if 
they are to continue as leaders of financial reform on the global 
stage” [Bowles et al. (2013)]. Those authors — the first named 
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of whom stood down as a British Liberal Democrat MEP at the 
May 2014 elections, having up until then chaired the European 
Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Committee — advocate the 
global regulatory herding that has been critically dissected in 
this paper. Our concern is not about whether or not regulation 
should (continue to) be under U.S. and E.U. leadership. Rather, 
we draw attention to the adverse consequences inherent in any 
international regulatory herding. 
As regulators internationally converge in their thinking — as 
regulatory crowding (thinking and acting similarly because 
sharing the same social and epistemic space) evolves into 
regulatory herding (thinking and acting similarly because we are 
strategically emulating each other) — so the questions of “too 
similar” and “too big” become as relevant for financial market 
regulations as for markets. We are only at the start of recognizing 
these phenomena and their consequences. 
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